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DBS policymaking in Japan 
An interpretive history 
Roya Akhavan-Majid 
 
Despite Japan's successful experimentation with DBS technology, 
fundamental conflicts of interest between NHK and Japan's commercial 
broadcasters continue to chart an uncertain course for the future of 
Japan's DBS programme. This study traces the history of DBS policy-
making in Japan, focusing on the role of the conflict between the two 
power groups in shaping Japanese DBS policy. The author highlights 
important policy considerations and discusses how the conflict between 
NHK and the commercial broadcasters must be resolved in order for 
Japan's DBS programme to be successfully implemented. 
 
Since the inception of Japan's DBS programme in 1972, direct broadcast 
satellite policy-making in Japan has been fraught with strong clashes of interest 
between NHK
1 and Japan's commercial broadcasters. Despite partial compromises 
which have allowed direct satellite broadcasting to move forward in Japan, 
fundamental conflicts of interest between the two power groups continue to chart an 
uncertain course for the future of Japan's  DBS programme. 
In an effort to provide an interpretive framework for understanding Japanese 
direct broadcast satellite policy, this study focuses on an analysis of the conflicting 
interests which have shaped DBS policy in Japan  throughout  the  1972-88 period. 
Outlined below are the basic directions of the interests of each relevant 
power group - NHK, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the 
commercial broadcasters - in relation to direct broadcast satellite policies. A 
detailed account of the conflicts arising from these different interests appears in 
the context of the discussion on the policy-making process. 
N H K 
NHK's pioneering role in experimentation with and development of new 
broadcasting technologies has always been a major component of its national 
prestige. Policies most favourable to NHK, therefore, would be those enabling it to 
continue its present domination of direct broadcast satellite development and 
operation in Japan. 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) 
As Japan's primary telecommunications authority, MPT would most benefit 
from policies that consolidate its position as the promoter and regulator of the new 
technology. 
Among the major components of MPT's power and jurisdictional authority in 
Japanese broadcasting is its direct supervisory responsibility for the country's public 
service broadcasting system, NHK. A strong and prestigious NHK, therefore, may be 
considered as a source of power for MPT as the supervising authority. 
It may thus be expected that in the policy-making process, MPT would 
support policies that lead to the successful development and utilization of DBS 
technology, and help to enhance NHK’s status and prestige. 
Commercial broadcasters 
In theory, Japanese broadcasting is based on a local origination system. In 
actuality, however, Japan's local commercial stations function primarily as 'affiliates' 
to the five major Tokyo 'key' stations, their major reason for existence being to relay 
the 'network' programmes.
2 Because direct broadcast satellites can perform this 
relaying function in a much more efficient manner, they are considered to pose a 
serious threat to Japan's local commercial broadcasters. 
Although this particular threat does not apply directly to the Tokyo key 
stations, a number of factors make DBS technology as threatening to the interests of 
Japanese 'network' stations as to those of their local affiliates. 
The first reason is that the financial interests of the key stations cannot, in 
effect, be separated from those of the local stations because of the extensive 
interlocking which exists between the 'networks' and their 'affiliates' through the 
conglomerate ownership of the media in Japan.
3
 
Media ownership in Japan is concentrated primarily in the hands of five major 
mass media conglomerates which own newspaper and broadcasting enterprises all 
over the country. The five major national newspapers, Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, 
Nikkei, and Sankei, are tied in cross-media ownership to Tokyo's five key television 
stations NTV, TV Asahi, TBS, TV Tokyo, and Fuji TV respectively. Despite 
regulations,
4 each of the five media conglomerates is headed by the same person who 
is often simultaneously the chairman of the key station and the president of the 
newspaper enterprise. In addition to the five national newspapers and broadcasting 
networks, media ownership in these conglomerates also extends to the local 
newspapers and television stations. Thus, although broadcasting regulations bar the 
key stations from owning shares in the local stations, an indirect interlocking 
between the interests of the Tokyo key stations and their local 'affiliates' is created 




Another threat posed by direct broadcast satellites to Japan's commercial 
broadcasters is in the area of advertising. With the intense interest of Japan's giant 
corporations in the type of nationwide advertising made  possible  by high definition  
satellite broadcasting  technology ,
6 it is only natural for Japan's commercial  
broadcasters  to fear  a  major loss of  revenue  to  advertising-supported   DBS  channels. 
It would thus be in the best interests of the Japanese commercial broadcasters 
either to halt the development of commercially operated direct broadcast satellites in 
Japan, or to dominate any such channels as the primary shareholders and programme 
providers. 
The policy-making process 
Japanese direct broadcast technology was developed by the Japan Space 
Development Committee and the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) as 
part of the country's national space development project.
7 In the context of Japan's 
space programme, the primary objectives of the DBS programme were to enable 
Japan to participate in the full spectrum of world space activities, and secure for 
Japan a strong international position as a leading provider of space technology. 
Japan's first experimental DBS project was initiated by the joint efforts of 
MPT and NHK in 1972. Launched in 1978, the experimental satellite (BSE) 
functioned until 1980 when a transponder failure brought a halt to the project. NHK, 
which bore 60% of the project's costs, used BSE to carry out various experiments 
including High Definition Television and multiplex sound broadcasting.
8
 
Subsequent to the completion of the BSE project, plans were initiated for the 
development of Japan's first operational satellite, BS2, to be launched as two 
satellites BS2-a (1984) and BS2-b (1985).
9 As in the case of the experimental 
satellite (BSE), BS2 was developed for exclusive use by NHK in fulfilling its 
mandate of providing nationwide coverage of its programmes and carrying out 
innovative technological experiments. With the launching of BS2-a in 1984, NHK 
was able to extend its geographical coverage to the 440 000 households which 
remained beyond the reach of NHK signals.
10
 
NHK's close involvement in the development and exclusive use of Japan's 
first two direct broadcast satellites proved from the beginning to be a source of great 
anxiety for the country's commercial broadcasters,
11 an anxiety which did not seem to 
be relieved by NHK's repeated assurances that it intended to use the satellites only 
for nationwide coverage and experimental purposes. 
The commercial broadcasters' general peril at the country's involvement in 
DBS technology, however, began to reach new heights in 1980, when MPT 
announced its intention to launch a new four-channel satellite (BS3) in 1988, 
allocating one of the four channels for commercial broadcasting purposes. Of the 
three remaining channels, one would be allocated to the Ministry of Education for 
establishing a University of the Air, and two would continue to be used by NHK for 
nationwide coverage and experimental purposes. 
The announcement by MPT of its plans met with the strong opposition of 
Japan's commercial broadcasters. Viewing DBS technology as a major threat to the 
reason for existence of the local stations, National Association of Commercial 
Broadcasters (NACB) chairman, Tadao Kunieda, publicly expressed his opposition 
to commercial use of DBS and insisted that neither the commercial broadcasters nor 
any other business entity should participate in the project.
12
 
Subsequently, in order to adjust the intensely conflicting interests in the 
broadcasting community and to further develop its DBS policies, MPT established in 
July 1980 a Study Committee on the Diversification of Broadcasting. As is the norm 
in such cases, the committee consisted of representatives of all relevant elite interests 
including NHK, the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters (NACB), 




Such semi-formal 'study committees' and 'advisory groups', bringing the 
parties to the conflict together for the purpose of achieving compromise, constitute 
the primary structures of  telecommunications policy-making in Japan. Even in cases 
where changes in policy entail the passing of legislation by the Diet, the actual 
process of bargaining and decision-making takes place in far more informal 'policy 
study groups' representing the contending elite interests.
14
 
In order to resolve the conflict and reach a compromise between the opposite 
views taken by the commercial broadcasters on the one hand and MPT and NHK on 
the other, the committee focused on finding a means of minimizing the adverse 
impact of the planned commercial DBS on the commercial broadcasters. In so doing, 
the committee made two specific recommendations. First , that the commercial 
channel be operated on the basis of a joint venture among existing commercial 
broadcasting entities and related interests and , second, that a system of pay-
television rather than advertising be adopted as the source of revenue.
15
 
Upon the issuance of the final report of the MPT Study Committee in 1982, a 
special committee, organized by the National Association of Commercial 
Broadcasters to finalize the Association's position in relation to the Committee's 
recommendations, concluded its deliberations as follows: 
If a third party other than the existing commercial broadcasting companies 
starts commercial satellite broadcasting funded by revenue from advertising, the 
existing commercial broadcasting companies will be seriously affected. Thus, in 
order to prevent such an undesirable situation, the commercial broadcasting 
companies consider it necessary to cooperate in satellite broadcasting . . . [The 
commercial broadcasters] intend to obtain one channel of the BS3 for commercial 
broadcasting, with revenue for its operation to be derived from pay- television . . . 
Capitalization of the joint venture company will be raised from [the commercial 
broadcasters as well as] other investors, but the combined share of the commercial 
broadcasters will be at least 51% of the total capital.
16
 
Thus, ultimately, faced with MPT's determination to launch the satellite, and 
fearing competition from other businesses eager to invest in the project, the 
commercial broadcasters agreed to participate in BS3, assuming that there would be 
no advertising and that they would hold a majority of the shares of the proposed 
commercial channel. 
Despite the seeming resolution of the conflicts at the time, however, several 
new developments followed which, once again, created problems for the commercial 
broadcasters and their participation in BS3's commercial channel. 
First, as negotiations regarding the allocation of shares in the planned joint 
venture company progressed, it became apparent that there was a much larger 
number of businesses interested in investing in the new company than had been 
originally anticipated. By the time the process of negotiations ended, the commercial 
broadcasters were left with a mere 19% of the shares as opposed to the majority share 
they had expected.
17 The rest of the shares were allocated as follows: the five major 
newspaper companies obtained 16%, other media-related businesses such as movie 
companies, publishers and advertising agencies received 4.6%, with the lion's share 
of over 60% going to a variety of big businesses, including Japan's major banks and 
trading houses.
18 In agreeing to give up their demand for a majority of the shares, the 
commercial broadcasters were given full control over the marketing and 
programming affairs in the joint venture company.
19 Nevertheless, a general sense of 
dissatisfaction continued to linger among the commercial broadcasters.
20
 
A further blow to the interests of the commercial broadcasters came in 1985, 
when NHK began considering plans to use one of the two DBS channels allocated to 
it to start a new NHK channel devoted to special DBS programming. (This move was 
formally authorized by MPT in June 1987, and the new service began a month later 
in July 1987.
21
) Taking advantage of its position as a public broadcaster supported by 
receiver fees, NHK later announced that it intended ultimately to finance the new 
DBS channel by charging an additional fee from all Japanese households equipped 
with a DBS dish antenna.
22 By charging an additional receiver fee for the DBS 
service, much in the  same manner as fees are charged to every household owning a 
television set , NHK would be able to guarantee for itself  a minimum revenue 
commensurate with the number of DBS dish antennas sold in Japan. 
The sudden change in NHK's DBS plans created a formidable threat of 
competition for the commercial broadcasters, a competition which would be 
especially difficult to beat because of NHK's ability as a public broadcaster 
automatically to count the DBS-equipped households as 'subscribers' to its DBS 
service, leaving the commercial broadcasters with the task of soliciting additional 
subscriptions from the same pool of households. 
Even more worrying to the commercial broadcasters, however, was the 
coupling of these aggressive moves with a growing tendency on the part of NHK to 
participate in a variety of commercial activities. 
Since the late 1970s, because of the saturation in the number of television 
receivers, on the one hand, and the increasing programme production costs, on the 
other, NHK had been faced with a ballooning deficit.
23 Because of the political 
difficulty of raising the receiver fees every time a budget deficit threatens, NHK 
requested and received MPT's permission in 1982 to engage in a wider range of 
outside commercial activities to support its public service programming.
24 Legally, it 
is legitimate for a public broadcasting entity in Japan to engage in commercial 
activities as long as it does not actually air advertisements, which is the only 
commercial activity specifically ruled out in the context of the Broadcast Law. 
Since then, to the horror of commercial broadcasters, NHK had continued to 
expand its commercial involvement through engaging in such activities as: 
• The establishment in 1985 of NHK Enterprises, a profit-orientated subsidiary 




• Major investment in two out of the three commercial teletext services 
operating in Japan since 1985.
26
 
• Development of plans to invest in, as well as function as a major programme 
provider to, cable television.
27
 
• Consideration   of   the   idea   of   accepting   'corporate   image'   (as 
opposed to 'product') advertising.
28
 
• Soliciting sponsorship by major Japanese manufacturers of posters and 
billboards advertising NHK programmes.
29 
One such poster, sponsored by NEC, for example, advertised NHK's coverage 
of the viewing of Halley's Comet, while emphasizing NEC's role in developing the 
technology which made the viewing of the comet possible. Another poster sponsored 
by Fujitsu, advertised a series of other NHK programmes, while prominently 
displaying Fujitsu Company's identification. 
NHK's growing contact with Japan's major manufacturers, and its increasing 
involvement in commercial activities, thus led Japan's commercial broadcasters to 
consider NHK"s ultimate commercialization as an imminent possibility. 
Should such fears of an ultimate NHK commercialization materialize, it 
would mean, among other things, that NHK would suddenly turn into a giant 
commercial entity in charge of two fully fledged high definition DBS channels 
greatly sought after by major national advertisers,
30 a possible development that 
spells doom to Japan's commercial broadcasters. 
Subsequently, the commercial broadcasters have tried, in a number of ways, 
to halt NHK's increasing tendency toward commercialization. Among the 
commercial broadcasters' efforts in countering such moves by NHK have been: 
• Repeated appeals to MPT to limit the scope of NHK's involvement in new 
broadcasting activities
31 which tend to increase its budget deficit and 
subsequently legitimize its involvement in commercial activities. 
• Personal appeals to the president of NHK, requesting a halt to all forms   of   
advertising-related activity,   including   manufacturer- sponsored posters.
32
 
• Private encouragement of the idea of government support for NHK as an 
alternative means of reducing NHK deficit.
33 
Thus far, however, the commercial broadcasters have had little success, either 
in containing NHK's expanding activities, or in reversing its tendency towards 
commercialization. This, of course, is due primarily to the fact that the change in 
NHK's orientation is not so much a result of deliberate policy choices made within 
NHK, but rather a function of the growing - and largely irreversible - financial 
pressures which currently face not only NHK, but also a number of other public 
service broadcasting systems. 
In the meantime, the general threat to the commercial broadcasters' 
interests has continued to grow as a result of NHK's success with its special DBS 
channel inaugurated in July 1987. The new round-the-clock 'Satellite TV No 1' 
channel - which can be received via a 45 cm dish antenna - has met with much 
public enthusiasm,
34 driving up the number of homes equipped to receive DBS in 
Japan from 230 000 in September 1987 to one million in December 1988.
35
 
Obviously, the lack of success on the part of the commercial broadcasters in 
obtaining a majority of the shares in the commercial DBS channel, and NHK's plans 
to compete in DBS programming coupled with its growing commercial activities, has 
created a situation in which it would be utterly self-destructive for the commercial 
broadcasters to participate in and actually promote DBS broadcasting in Japan. Thus, 
despite their formal consent in 1982 to participate in the joint venture DBS company 
(Japan Satellite Co), Japan's media conglomerates may be expected to continue, as 
they have, to try to stall the launching of BS3 - already postponed from 1988 to 




In the meantime, joint reception via cable and communication satellites 
promises to compete with direct satellite broadcasting.
37 Although a high level of 
market uncertainty and lack of sufficient programme production capacity have, until 
recently, hampered the development of cable television in Japan, several large-scale 
CATV enterprises are now poised to enter the cablecasting market.  Among them is a 
giant big business-mass media joint venture,  representing three major publishing houses, 
four media conglomerates, some of Japan's largest financial combines (Mitsubishi, 
Marubeni, Ito-Chu, and Nissho Iwai), and a variety of other media companies and 
prominent businesses.
38
 Another is a joint venture between nearly 20 Japanese and 
American companies, including the Tokyo Broadcasting Company, NHK Enterprises, 
Dentsu (Japan's largest advertising  company), and such US film giants as Viacom, HBO, 
Columbia Pictures, and Twentieth Century Fox.
39 While the ultimate success of these 
ventures is difficult to predict, it is true that the greater economic efficiency of joint 
reception via CS+CATV, arising from  its ability to provide a much larger number of 
channels for considerably lower cost, gives joint reception a formidable competitive edge 
over direct satellite broadcasting. Should pay-cable ultimately grow into a healthy 
business in Japan by the time BS3 is scheduled to be launched in 1991, direct satellite 
broadcasting in Japan may come to face increasing questions of commercial feasibility. 
Despite the obstacles posed in the path of DBS development in Japan by the 
conflict of interest between NHK and the commercial broadcasters (and the potential 
competition from CS+CATV), however, the role of Japan's DBS programme in serving 
the country's overall industrial policy continues to provide strong impetus to MPT's 
efforts toward its successful implementation. 
Thus far, the programme has served the country's industrial objectives well. Not 
only has the DBS programme enabled Japan to develop extensively its space 
manufacturing capability, it has also resulted in the development by Japanese 
manufacturers of a variety of new DBS- related technologies, including smaller and more 
economical satellite dish antennas. 
Another important technological component of the DBS programme has been 
NHK's successful experimentation with high-definition broadcasting via DBS. Using 
BS2a, in 1984 NHK pioneered a new system called MUSE (Multiple Sub-Nyquist 
Sampling Encoding), with which a single satellite channel can transmit high-definition 
programmes. Should NHK ultimately succeed in getting its standard adopted globally, 
this would give the Japanese manufacturers a considerable head-start in the competition 
to capture the world's lucrative HDTV market. 
Based on these important industrial policy considerations, efforts towards DBS 
development in Japan are likely to continue full-force. Given the level of influence 
exercised by Japan's mass media conglomerates in all matters of Japanese media policy, 
however, an ultimate resolution of the conflict between NHK and the commercial 
broadcasters continues to remain a major prerequisite to the successful implementation of 
Japan's DBS programme. 
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